We examine the value of incorporating regulatory information into the court liability decision and making it publicly available, when the causality of harm is uncertain. Public access to regulatory information, coupled with its use in a liability decision, not only improves the accuracy of court adjudication but also guides victims to more informed decisions about their lawsuits, when victims' private information on causality of harm is verifiable to the court. When victims' information is unverifiable, however, withholding regulatory information until after victims bring lawsuits induces them to utilize their private information better in their litigation decisions, and thus may be socially desirable.
Introduction
* Uncovering truth is an essential part of court proceedings. In tort cases, for example, courts expend many resources processing information to determine the magnitude of harm, negligence, injurers' liability, etc. While litigants are the main providers of information under the current adversarial system, the government is also an important source of information when performing its role as regulator. Various regulatory agencies monitor potential tortfeasors (e.g., polluting chemical firms) and collect relevant information (e.g., monthly pollution discharges). This regulatory information can be used later in a court proceeding should a lawsuit be brought against the party to whom the information is relevant. More important, several U.S. laws allow public probability of the defendant's causing harm decreases with preventive effort at a diminishing rate. To ensure an interior solution, we further assume that p'(O) = -cc and p'(oo) = 0. The defendant's effort is unobservable to the other parties.
The victim can alternatively be harmed by a natural accident with probability n(> 0). The two events of harm are mutually exclusive, with n + p(e) ' 1 for all e 2 0. Note that the defendant has no control over the likelihood of naturally caused harm. The harm results in a loss, 1, that is randomly drawn from [0, L] by the same distribution function F and density f, regardless of the source.8 In other words, the same risky activity causes different levels of harm, depending on the random circumstances.9
The victim, if injured, acquires only imperfect knowledge about the source of harm. She draws a private signal s E {s,, Sd} where s, and Sd respectively indicate that harm was naturally and defendant-caused. The signal could represent, for example, the plaintiff's knowledge of her health condition, episodes of rivals' predatory trade practices, or experience of product malfunctions. The precision of the signal is represented by 8 E [1/2, 1], the probability of receiving a correct signal conditional on the actual cause of harm. When 8 = 1/2, the signal is uninformative; when 8 = 1, the signal is perfectly informative. The victim draws her signal prior to her litigation decision. Although we do not explicitly model how the signal is revealed during litigation, we assume that the presence of such information is public knowledge, so even a signal that is unfavorable to the plaintiff is revealed during trial, for example, at the defendant's request.
A lawsuit by the victim (or plaintiff) always results in litigation.10 The plaintiff and the defendant bear their litigation costs, cp and Cd, respectively (i.e., the American fee system). The social planner designs the liability system as well as the information system. When trial occurs, the social planner verifies the realized harm, 1, and determines the defendant's liability. Unobservability of the defendant's effort precludes a liability rule depending on it (e.g., negligence rule), so the court uses a strict liability rule that depends on verifiable causality information. ' In addition to the victim's causality signal, the social planner can acquire, through ex ante regulatory monitoring or ex post discovery, causality information, r E {rJ, rd}, where r, and rd respectively indicate that the harm was naturally and defendantcaused.12 This signal could represent, for example, regulatory information about the carcinogenic quality of air pollution, "smoking gun" evidence of a predatory practice, or information on safety problems in a car design. The precision of the signal is represented by 0 E [1/2, 1], the probability of receiving a correct signal conditional on the actual cause of harm.
The three rules that the planner chooses are more precisely described as follows:
(i) Simple rule: The social planner does not draw r. In litigation, the defendant is liable if and only if s = Sd, when the signal is verifiable. When the plaintiff's signal is unverifiable, the defendant is liable for all verified harm.'3 8 The assumption that the distribution of harm is independent of the source of harm is not essential. Our results remain valid, provided that the plaintiff does not infer causality perfectly from the realized level of harm.
9 Alternatively, there is a continuum of victims with different levels of harm. The subsequent results of the article hold with this interpretation, unless victims' signals are independent and the court can aggregate the victims' information efficiently. In the latter case, the court can establish perfect causality, by the law of large numbers.
10 That is, we abstract from the possibility of pretrial settlement. This assumption is obviously unrealistic, since most lawsuits result in settlement. See Section 5 for further discussion of this issue.
" Our model departs from the existing models of strict liability that assume the court's ability to establish causality of harm without errors. Shavell (1985) (iii) Ex post rule: The social planner draws r only after a lawsuit is brought (e.g., during discovery). Equivalently, the social planner collects r but withholds it until after a lawsuit is brought. Liability is determined in the same way as in (ii).
Under each rule, we assume that the social planner can adjust the level of damages in an ex ante credible way with a multiplier, m > 0. In other words, a prevailing plaintiff with harm 1 receives ml, and a losing defendant pays ml. This type of damage adjustment can be achieved through the imposition of punitive damages when m > 1. While our purpose here is primarily normative-to examine the potential of each rule under the best policy arrangement currently available15 -the damage adjustment that we envision is consistent with the current use of punitive damages. Under the current system, judges instruct the juries to set punitive damages, not by a fixed multiplier, but often to fit the deterrence needs of a specific setting.16 In this sense, our analysis imposes no additional requirement: judges can inform the juries of the deterrence needs under each rule.
When the plaintiff's information is verifiable
* In this section we assume that the plaintiff's causality signal is verifiable and thus admissible in court as evidence. We analyze each regime by backward induction, starting from the plaintiff's lawsuit decision, moving next to the defendant's effort choice, and finally examining the social planner's damage award adjustment. At the end of this section we compare the performance of alternative rules.
El
Simple rule. Given a damage multiplier, m, the plaintiff brings a lawsuit when she can establish the defendant's liability and her expected damage award is no less than her litigation costs. Since under the simple rule the court relies on the plaintiff's signal to determine the defendant's liability, the plaintiff will bring a lawsuit if and only if (a) s = Sd and (b) ml : cp. Given the defendant's effort e, the plaintiff receives a signal Sd if either defendant-caused harm correctly triggers the plaintiff's signal or naturally caused harm incorrectly triggers the plaintiff's signal. The combined probability of these events is [p(e)S + n(1 -s)]. The probability of (b) is (1 -F(cp/m)).
Thus the probability of a lawsuit is proving harm is sufficient for establishing a defendant's liability. Our results remain qualitatively unaffected if the defendant is liable with probability less than one.
14 This rule represents just one possible evidence standard that can be employed by the court. Alternatively, the court may use an evidence standard that is more unfavorable to the defendant (e.g., only one unfavorable signal may be required to convict the defendant). This alternative standard is socially inferior to the one considered in this article. The proof is available upon request. 15 The government may conceivably use other instruments, such as fee shifting and the decoupling of damages. The former instrument is inferior to damage adjustment (Kaplow, 1993) , whereas the latter instrument, though theoretically superior to damage adjustment (Polinsky and Che, 1991) , is seldom used in practice. Relatively speaking, punitive damages are much more common (Daniels and Martin, 1995) . Moreover, our main results are robust to the decoupling arrangement. such that e satisfies (2), where 7 -E[l], the (unconditional) expected loss from harm. Note that the naturally caused harm is excluded since it is beyond the social planner's control. A solution to (3) exists, and we denote it as (ms, e5).17 We assume that m > 0 (i.e., it is never optimal to block litigation altogether), which can be guaranteed by assuming that cp and Cd are small relative to 1.
Recall that if the plaintiff's signal is not perfectly informative (8 < 1), naturally caused harm can result in a lawsuit. As can be seen from (3), this lawsuit imposes social costs but has no value in providing deterrence. On this count, the next two rules can improve upon the simple rule.
El Ex ante rule. Under the ex ante rule, the social planner gathers signal r and releases it to the plaintiff prior to her decision to sue. If a lawsuit is brought, the defendant is found liable in trial if evidence from both the plaintiff and the social planner implicates the defendant. Given this liability rule, the plaintiff brings a lawsuit if and only if r=rd, s = Sd, and m -cp, or with probability 
Note that (7) differs from (1) only because of the plaintiff's uncertain prospect of prevailing.
Knowing the liability rule and the plaintiff's suit decision, the defendant chooses e to min e + 4p(e, e, m){cd + a(e)ml(a(e)m)}, for any m and the plaintiff's belief e. Note that the defendant assesses the probability of his being liable based on the actual level of his effort. This problem has a unique minimizer, e(e), for any belief e. In equilibrium, the plaintiff's belief must be consistent: e(e) = e. This condition is satisfied by a unique, positive value of e, since e(O) > 0 and e(-) is nonincreasing. 18 The unique equilibrium effort level e is characterized by the following first-order condition: We first compare the simple rule and the ex ante rule. Comparing (1) and (4) reveals that the ex ante rule has two qualitatively different effects.
The first is what we call the "Becker effect": given the same m, the ex ante rule excludes the defendant-triggered lawsuit with probability 1 -0. In the public enforcement context, this procedure, coupled with an appropriately increased penalty, is known to reduce enforcement costs without weakening deterrence (Becker, 1968) . Its outcome is less clear in the context of private litigation, however. As m is raised to restore deterrence once a suit is randomly excluded, the victim's incentive for suit increases, which at least partially offsets the initial exclusion effect.
The net effect depends on whether the conditional adjusted award ml(m) increases or decreases when m is raised. If ml(m) increases with m, the increase in m needed to restore the same level of deterrence is small enough that the probability of a defendanttriggered lawsuit is lower under the ex ante rule than under the simple rule (see (4) and (5)). Therefore, the Becker effect exists and favors the ex ante rule over the simple rule. However, if ml(m) decreases with m, the increase in m needed to restore deterrence is so large that the probability of a defendant-triggered lawsuit actually increases. In this case, the Becker effect is reversed. Whether ml(m) is increasing or decreasing in m is generally ambiguous (since l(m) decreases in m), but ml(m) is likely to be increasing for a broad class of distribution functions.19 Throughout the analysis, we assume that ml(m) is nondecreasing in m. This assumption permits the Becker effect to be operative but weak.20
The second effect is the "information effect": the relative likelihood of a naturally triggered lawsuit to a defendant-triggered lawsuit is smaller under the ex ante rule than under the simple rule. To understand this effect, set the multiplier under the ex ante rule, m', so that the probability of a defendant-triggered lawsuit is the same as it is The information effect arises because the additional information provided by the social planner allows the plaintiff to avoid suing when the harm is likely to be naturally caused. Given that a naturally triggered lawsuit has no value in providing deterrence (see (2) and (5)), the information effect always favors the ex ante rule. Combining these two effects, we conclude that if the Becker effect is not reversed or if the reversion is not too strong, the ex ante rule induces, under the appropriately chosen multiplier, the same level of the defendant's effort at a lower likelihood of a lawsuit (especially the naturally triggered one) than the simple rule. Thus, the ex ante rule dominates the simple rule.
We next compare the ex ante and ex post rules. Under the ex post rule, the plaintiff has no access to regulatory information before bringing a suit, just like under the simple rule. Therefore, the information effect again favors the ex ante rule over the ex post rule. The Becker effect, however, is ambiguous between the two rules. Just like the ex ante rule, the ex post rule excludes a defendant-triggered lawsuit with some probability. Nevertheless, the ex ante rule can be shown to dominate the ex post rule. The results are presented in the following proposition. Proposition 1. For any 0 > 1/2 and 5 < 1, the ex ante rule is socially more desirable than the ex post rule, which is in turn more desirable than the simple rule.
Proof See the Appendix.
The second result deserves a remark. Under both the simple rule and the ex post rule, the plaintiff cannot base her suit decision on the social planner's realized signal. Yet the ex post rule performs better than the simple rule. This result can be attributed to the plaintiff's uncertain prospect of receiving the favorable regulatory signal in court under the ex post rule. Because of this uncertainty, the effective ex ante award multiplier facing the plaintiff in her suit decision is 8a(e)m, while the effective ex ante penalty multiplier facing the defendant is &lm. Since a(e) < 0 when 5 < 1 and 0 > 1/2, the ex post rule creates the effect of decoupling: from an ex ante perspective, the defendant pays more than the plaintiff receives. This kind of decoupling makes an enforcement system more efficient (Polinsky and Che, 1991).
The above proposition suggests that more information is better. The same can be said when the precision of a given signal increases. The use of a more accurate signal reduces the chance of a naturally triggered lawsuit relative to a defendant-triggered lawsuit, which allows the social planner to generate a given level of deterrence at lower litigation costs than otherwise. The proof of Proposition 2 closely resembles that of Proposition 1 and is thus omitted. The second statement deserves a remark. If the victim has a perfectly informative signal, she is capable of making a fully informed decision about her lawsuit. In this case, conditioning the defendant's liability on the additional signal (provided by the government) has no effect other than excluding the defendant-triggered suit with some probability. When 0 = 1, the latter effect disappears, so all three rules become identical. 
When the plaintiff's signal is unverifiable
Unlike in the previous section, neither (10) nor (11) contains &. In other words, the victim's signal has no effect on the likelihood of a suit and the defendant's effort decision. Hence, the victim may sue even when she is certain of the defendant's innocence, and may not sue when she is certain of the defendant's guilt. As before, the social planner picks m and e to: min p(e)l + e + ifa(e, m){cp + Cd} (12) such that e satisfies (11).
We denote the solution to (12) It may be surprising that the predictive power of the victim's signal depends also on 0. To see why, suppose 3 = 1 but 0 = 1/2 (i.e., the regulatory signal is uninformative). Then, b(e) = a(e). In this case, the victim's signal does not affect her suit decision. The reason is simple: while the victim's signal is perfectly informative about true causality, it has no predictive value as to the causality that the court will find in trial, which depends on the (uninformative) regulatory signal.
The probability that the plaintiff brings a lawsuit is qfp, e, m) pd(e, e, m) + qfpn(e, e, m), (Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium can be established as in Section 3.) The two coefficients on p'(e) capture the amounts of deterrence generated by the suit following S = Sd and the suit following s = s,,s respectively. One can verify that the suit following S = Sd creates more deterrence per unit probability of a suit than does the suit following s = sn. Intuitively, the former type of suit more likely punishes the defendant when he is actually responsible for the harm. Therefore, the former type of suit is socially more desirable. In the special case where 5 and 0 are both close to one, the ex post rule induces a socially efficient suit decision from the victim, as she sues only if s = Sd Again, the social planner chooses m and e to min p(e)l + e + qfpr(e, m){cp + Cd} (15) such that e satisfies (14).
The solution to this problem is denoted as (me, er).
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Comparison of regimes. The tradeoff between the two rules is clear from the discussion of the preceding subsections. Although the ex ante rule induces the victim to condition her suit decision on the regulatory signal, it fails to induce her to be responsive to her own signal. The converse is true with the ex post rule, under which the victim is unresponsive to the regulatory signal but does incorporate her own signal into the suit decision (in trying to anticipate the regulatory signal).
Thus the issue boils down to the following question: To which signal should the victim be made responsive? Intuition suggests that if the victim's signal is relatively less informative than the social planner's signal, then the ex ante rule must be preferred to the ex post rule. The previous subsection, meanwhile, suggests that if both signals are sufficiently informative, the ex post rule performs relatively well. These conjectures are verified in the following proposition. Proof. See the Appendix.
The last assumption means that the naturally caused harm is relatively significant. Intuitively, the value of deterring the naturally triggered lawsuit is high in such a case.
The above proposition has interesting policy implications for public access to regulatory information: Revealing regulatory information is socially desirable when either the victim's signal or the regulatory signal is poor, while withholding regulatory information is desirable if both signals are good and the victim's signal is better. The latter possibility is the most novel result of this article and lends support to selective limitation of public access to regulatory information in situations where the public has better information than the government. One application may be found in the area of simple accident cases. If the victim has first-hand information about the injurer's guilt or innocence, it may be socially desirable to limit the victim's access to the information held by a third-party witness until after the victim brings a lawsuit, since the withholding of the information can make the victim act more responsibly in making her suit decision.
Concluding remarks
* We conclude by commenting on the robustness of our results and further implications. a Compensatory damages. We have assumed that the social planner can adjust damages. While this assumption allows us to focus on the normative aspects of managing regulatory information, it is also useful to examine this issue in a compensatory damages setting (where m is restricted to be one). When damages cannot be adjusted, there is underdeterrence, since the defendant does not internalize the litigation costs of the plaintiff. Under the ex ante rule, this underdeterrence problem is worsened because of the exclusion effect, so the application of compensatory damages disfavors the ex ante rule. Still, the benefit of screening a naturally triggered lawsuit remains an important consideration. In fact, given stronger conditions, our main results continue to hold with compensatory damages.21 Of course, compensatory damages introduce other issues (such as the potential optimality of other evidentiary rules), which warrant further studies. a Pretrial discovery. We have assumed that a lawsuit always results in trial. This assumption, while simplifying our analysis greatly, is unrealistic because most legal disputes are settled before trial. If pretrial settlement involves costless discovery, it can affect the ex post rule adversely, since the victim may sue regardless of her own signal and simply drop her case if discovery reveals little chance of prevailing. In practice, however, pretrial discovery can be costly. First of all, it usually requires the involvement of attorneys. Second, discovery requires the parties seeking information to bring oral deposition against information sources, which can be often costly. If pretrial discovery is costly, the main results of our article still hold. a Costly information gathering. In the analysis, we assumed that parties gather their signals costlessly. In practice, regulatory monitoring may incur substantial expenditures. Introduction of information-gathering costs favors the ex post rule relative to the ex ante rule. The ex ante rule is not cost effective because it requires information to be gathered even when there is no subsequent litigation. The ex post rule may allow information to be gathered only when a suit is brought. In some cases, however, the ex ante rule still appears to be a favorable option. In securities cases, for example, the regulatory agency (the Securities and Exchange Commission) can almost costlessly gather information by simply requiring firms to report their financial status. In environmental cases, even though regulatory monitoring is costly, it may be the only way to gather accurate information about pollution. In other words, when victims have very coarse information, the ex ante rule may still be a dominant choice (recall Proposition 3 (i)). a Frivolous suits. The concern of our article can be rephrased as how to deter lawsuits when plaintiffs are relatively certain of defendants' innocence. In our framework, these kinds of suits are meritless because even though they constitute social costs, they do not generate any deterrence. Yet these suits are not exactly "frivolous" by the conventional definition, according to which a lawsuit is frivolous if the plaintiff has a low probability of winning and brings the suit solely to extract a settlement (Rosenberg and Shavell, 1985; Bebchuk, 1988; Katz, 1990; Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1993) . This conventional definition is not appropriate in a world where courts lack the ability to uncover truth. The cases that have a high chance of prevailing according to public information may actually be meritless according to (potentially superior but unverifiable) information that plaintiffs themselves possess. Our "information-based" notion of meritless suits may be useful in this situation. (11)). This shows that the ex post rule with m' induces a higher effort than ec,. It then follows that there exists m"(< m') with which the ex post rule induces e,. But at m" the probability of a suit is lower under the optimal ex post rule. Since m" is not necessarily optimal under the ex post rule, the ex post rule dominates the ex ante rule. Since the result holds with strict inequality, by continuity, it holds when n > p(e,,) -E for some E > 0. Q.E.D.
